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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL
\
SAVINGS AND LOAN
|
ASSOCIATION, a corporation, I
Plaintiff and Respondent, 1
vs
> Case No. 8720
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND
INDEMNITY COMPANY,
\
a corporation,
I
Defendant and Appellant. I
ANSWER OF PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION TO PETITION
FOR REHEARING OF HARTFORD ACCIDENT
AND INDEMNITY COMPANY
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT MADE CERTAIN FINDINGS
OF FACT WHICH ARE COMPLETE ANSWERS TO
THE CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT CONTAINED
IN POINT I OF APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING.

Respondent invites the Court's attention to the
following Findings of Fact:
"9. The agreement of July 19, 1950 (PR 2)
was subsequently modified by written agreement
dated September 20, 1950 (PR 5) which recited
l
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that there had been delay in recording the mortgages
and thereby a delay was incurred in securing availability of funds and, therefore, the time for completion of the dwelling houses was extended. Hartford
agreed to this modification." (Ex PR 5 and Ex PR
4 support this Finding.)
"10. On August 10, 1950 Syndicate, Prudential, Cassady and Associated Accountants entered
into an agreement (PR 8) which in substance provided that all funds made available by Prudential
from proceeds of the veterans' mortgages should
be disbursed by and through Associated Accountants. Prudential was to transmit available funds to
Associated Accountants for disbursement. The disbursements were to be made in accordance with
tables attached to the agreement based upon the
amount of the funds paid by Prudential to Associated Accountants and the progress of the work.
* * * * " . (Italics supplied) (Ex PR 8 supports this
Finding)
"13. Actual construction work on the project
was commenced prior to June 22, 1950 by way of
excavating basements and footings for the dwelling
houses. This work was performed before any mortgage in favor of Prudential was recorded. As a consequence, all of the parties to the transaction were
aware of the fact that liens of unpaid material men
and laborers would be senior to the liens of the mort2
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gages. Prudential, therefore, demanded that not only
the bond (PR 1) described in Finding 12 designating Prudential as an obligee, be executed but also
that each mortgage loan be insured by an ATA
title policy so as to afford Prudential double protection against senior material and labor liens. Security Title Company, a Utah corporation doing business in Salt Lake City was the resident agent of
Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company which
agreed to write these policies. It agreed to issue the
ATA policies provided, however, Pacific Coast Title
Insurance Company was also made an Obligee under
the $763,000.00 bond. (PR 1)" (This finding is
supported by substantial evidence found at R. 35,
R. 59, R. 60, R. 170, R. 171, R. 172, R. 232, R. 318,
R. 319, R. 324, R. 332)
"14. Sales of the homes in Morningside
Heights were negotiated by a firm of real estate
agents in Salt Lake, acting for and employed by
Syndicate. At the times the bond (PR 1) and the
contracts above described (PR 2, PR 7 and PR 8)
were executed, only part of the dwelling houses
were sold. The sale of these houses was an operation which continued into December of 1950. This
fact, plus necessary time consumed in processing
the mortgage applications by the Veterans Administration through its Salt Lake office and the further fact that the completion of the transactions and
3
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and the securing of the execution of the mortgages
by the veterans and their wives required additional
time, delayed the recordation of the mortgages in
the office of the Recorder of Salt Lake County. Prudential had no duty or authority to disburse any
funds for or on behalf of a veteran-borrower unless
and until his mortgage was duly recorded. As soon
as the mortgage processing was completed and a
mortgage was recorded, Prudential promptly transmitted to Associated Accountants then available
funds. There was no unreasonable delay or lack of
diligence on Prudential's part at any time in effecting disbursement of the mortgage funds." (This
Finding is supported by substantial evidence found
at R. 362, R. 363, R. 364, R. 366 and by Ex PR 7
and Ex PR 8).
"16. Cassady failed to complete said dwelling
houses within the time required by his said contract with Syndicate dated July 19, 1950 (PR 2) as
modified by said Supplemental Agreement dated
September 20, 1950 (PR 5). By the month of February 1951 none of the dwelling houses had been
completed so as to meet the requirements of the
Veterans Administration and work on the project
had all but ceased. On February 16,1951, Syndicate,
Prudential, Cassady and Associated Accountants
executed a Supplemental Agreement (PR 6) whereby they agreed to the amendment in specified par4
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ticulars of the Contract of June 16, 1950 between
Prudential and Syndicate (PR 7 ) ; the contract of
July 19, 1950 (PR 2) between Syndicate and Cassady as amended by Agreement of September 20,
1950 (PR 5) and the contract of August 10, 1950
between Prudential, Syndicate, Cassady and Associated Accountants (PR 8) as amended by Agreement of August 22, 1950 (PR 3). By the Supplemental Agreement dated February 16, 1951 (PR
6) the parties agreed:
a. That the dwelling houses should be completed by June 1, 1951 and the failure to complete
said houses by said date or default by Syndicate to
perform all things necessary to secure final approval of Veterans Administration would give Prudential at its election the right to complete the project
(amending Par 7 of Art II of Contract of June 16,
1950 (PR 7).
b. That all unexpended mortgage proceeds
held by Prudential might be disbursed by Prudential at such time or times and in such manner and
in such amounts as in the sole judgment and discretion of Prudential was necessary and proper to
secure the expeditious completion of said dwelling
houses and payment of all material men or laborers
(Amending Par 4 of Art I of Contract of June 16,
1950 (PR 7).
c. Cassady would construct 29 houses instead
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of 26 houses based on Floor Plan I for the price of
$7800.00 each; 35 houses instead of 36 houses based
on Floor Plan 3 for $7340.00 each and 36 houses
instead of 30 houses based on Floor Plan 4 for
$7920.00 (Amending Par 22 of Contract of July
19,1950 (PR 2 ) ;
d. All payments under the Contract of July
19, 1950 (PR 2) would be paid by Prudential to
subcontractors through a bonded disbursing agency,
but should be at such time or times, and in such
manner and in such amounts as Prudential deemed
necessary and proper to secure the payment of all
subcontractors, material men and laborers (Amending Par 23, Art III of Contract of July 19, 1950
(PR 2).
e. By this supplemental agreement of February 16,1951 (PR 6) Cassady irrevocably admitted
that it had secured from Syndicate and Associated
Accountants an accounting of all funds paid by
Prudential to Associated Accountants and confirmed and approved all of the disbursements made by
Associated Accountants to the date of the agreement.
f. By this Supplemental Agreement of February 16, 1951 (PR 6), Syndicate, Cassady and
Associated Accountants admitted they had secured
from Prudential an accounting of the proceeds of all
mortgage loans and down payments and disbursements thereof by Prudential to date of agreement;
6
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confirmed and approved all disbursements made by
Prudential to date of agreement and admitted,
agreed and declared that Prudential had performed
all of its obligations under the contract of June 16,
1950 (PR 7) the contract of August 10, 1950 (PR
8) and Supplemental Agreement of August 22,1950
(PR 3) from respective dates thereof to February
16, 1951." (This Finding is supported by Ex PR 6.)
"17. The Supplemental Agreement dated February 16, 1951 (PR 6) became effective upon approval by Hartford and Pacific Coast Title Insurance Company. This Agreement was approved in
full on February 20, 1951 by said Title Insurance
Company and was presented to Hartford on the same
date, and thereby it gained full knowledge thereof.
By endorsement it consented to the amendment of
Pars. 22 and 23, Art III of the Contract of July
19, 1950, and Par. 7, Art II of the Contract of
August 22, 1950." (This finding is supported by
Ex PR 6)
"29. Any delay in disbursing the mortgage
proceeds by Prudential at the commencement of
work in the summer of 1950 on the Morningside
Heights project was caused by Cassady prematurely
commencing work on the project before the execution, delivery and recording of the mortgages executed by the veteran-borrowers. Cassady knew that
Prudential would not disburse the mortgage pro7
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ceeds until mortgages were properly executed and
recorded. The time lag thereby occasioned was the
direct and immediate result of Cassady's own action
in commencing construction work before mortgage
funds were available under the terms of said several contracts. Cassady assumed this risk of his own
volition and choice" (This Finding is supported by
substantial evidence found at R. 38, R. 39, R. 47,
R. 232, R. 233, R. 249, R. 318, R. 319, R. 320, R. 321,
R. 322, R. 324, R. 326, R. 327, R. 332, R. 333.)
"31. After the effective date of said Supplemental Agreement of February 16, 1951 (PR 6)
Prudential in honesty and in good faith exercised
its discretion in disbursing mortgage proceeds in
payment of the obligations due to sub-contractors
and in payment of laborers and material employed
and used in the construction of dwelling houses on
said project. Prudential did not withhold or delay
the payment of any mortgage proceeds that it was
rightfully authorized to disburse." (This Finding
is supported by substantial evidence found at R.
104, R. 105, R. 374).
"39. Felt Syndicate, Inc. did not breach its
contractual obligations to Cassady or to Hartford in
any substantial manner and any differences between
them were resolved by extensions of time granted
to Cassady Company, Inc. and by the Supplemental
Agreement between the parties entered February
8
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16, 1951." (This Finding is supported by substantial evidence found in Ex PR 4, Ex PR 5, Ex PR 6,
R. 348).
Appellant in its Petition for Rehearing has
quoted from the court's opinion in this case six
separate statements which have been removed from
the context of the opinion. (Sub-paragraphs 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6 of Appellant's Point I). These quotations are
asserted to be proof that the Court's decision "is
based on a misapprehension of certain fundamental
facts." The principal vein of thought which runs
through this contention is that Felt breached its
contract with Cassady "because Felt failed to pay
Cassady the course of construction payments provided in the primary construction contract, and also
in the disbursal agreement."
By way of further defense Appellant argues
that Appellant is bound by the Supplemental Agreement of February 16, 1951 (Ex PR 6) only to a
limited degree (Subparagraphs 5 and 6, Point I),
and hence this Agreement has no bearing upon the
ultimate liability of Appellant.
Respondent believes it should again emphasize
four propositions in this case, which cannot be denied, by quoting from page 59 of its original brief:
"1. Cassady failed, neglected and refused to procure the 100 dwelling houses in
Morningside Heights to be constructed in ac9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cordance with the plans and specifications
approved by Veterans Administration. (Hartford admits this fact).
"2. Cassady failed, neglected and refused to secure from Veterans Administration
its approval of the construction of such dwelling houses. (Hartford admits this fact).
"3. Because the said dwelling houses
were not constructed in accordance with the
plans and specifications approved by the Veterans Administration, it refused to guarantee
the mortgages owned and held by Prudential.
(Hartford admits this fact).
"4. As a result of the refusal of Veterans' Administration to guarantee said mortgages, Prudential suffered damages. (Hartford on this appeal has neither questioned the
amount of damages awarded Prudential nor
the method of the trial Court in determining
these damages)."
Respondent also quotes from its original brief,
(page 60) its comments on the foregoing four propositions :
"It is manifest, therefore, that Cassady
was guilty of violation of the contract dated
July 19, 1950 between Felt and Cassady (Ex.
PR 2) performance of which by Cassady was
guaranteed by Hartford. Since Prudential was
a third party beneficiary under said contract
it had a direct action thereon against Cassady
for its violation thereof and an action against
Hartford as surety on Cassady's bond. The
bond itself specifically designated Prudential as an obligee thereof and recognized its
clear right to claim and sue thereon."
10
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"Prudential, therefore, respectfully but
emphatically asserts to the Court that it has
affirmatively made its case against Hartford
and the evidence in the action fully supports
that conclusion beyond per adventure."
In order to meet Respondent's case, Appellant
must assume a defensive position and it does this
by throwing up the exceedingly thin line of defense
that "Felt failed to pay Cassady the course of construction payments." Appellant has chosen to ignore
the Findings of Fact above set forth. At no place
in its Petition does it question a Finding of Fact
made by the trial Court. Its main attack is upon
certain phraseology of the Court's opinion. The
reason for this strategy is obvious — each Finding
above quoted is supported by competent, substantial evidence, and to quote from the Court's opinion:
"Inasmuch as the trial court found in
favor of the plaintiffs, they are entitled to
have us review the evidence and every reasonable inference fairly to be drawn therefrom
in the light most favorable to them." (Buehner
Block Co., v. Glezos, 6 Utah (2d) 226; 310
Pac (2d) 517; Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah (2d)
127;262Pac (2d) 760.)
1. Cassady cannot claim a violation by Felt
of the "course of construction" payments formula.
Cassady before entering upon the construction
work knew (a) that the only source of funds from
11
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which it was to obtain payment was the proceeds
of the veterans' mortgages; (b) that such funds
would not be available until the veterans' application
was processed by Veterans' Administration; (c)
that Prudential must approve the loan; (d) that
the veteran and his wife must execute all required
mortgage papers; and (e) that the mortgage must
be recorded on the public records. Notwithstanding
such knowledge, Cassady elected to commence work.
It assumed the risk and hazard of such process.
Findings 14 and 29 are the only Findings which
could have been made by the Trial Court on the evidence in this case. Cassady's difficulties stemmed
not from the delay in the "course of construction"
payments, but from its own action in commencing
construction work before funds were available under the contracts. The Construction Agreement of
July 19, 1950 (Ex. PR 2) and the disbursing agreement of August 10, 1950 (Ex. PR 8) to which Cassady was a party, specifically gave Cassady notice
as to the source of funds and when and how they
were to be paid it. The testimony of C. J. Cassady
is replete with admissions of Cassady's complete
knowledge of this situation. Cassady cannot enter
upon such course of conduct, with full knowledge
of the hazards and perils of such "calculated risk"
(See Scott's testimony at R. 325, 326, 333) and then
when the risk turned against it, attempt to rely upon
12
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the strict terms of the contract. By its own conduct
rendered impossible performance by Felt of the
"course of construction" formula of the agreement.
Upon this state of facts the Trial Court properly
found that there had been no substantial breach of
contract by Syndicate. (Finding 39).
2. Cassady by the Agreement of February
16,1951 (Ex. PR 6) acknowledged full performance
by Prudential of the Agreement of June 16, 1950,
(Ex. PR 7), the Agreement of August 10,1950 (Ex
PR 8) and of the Agreement of August 22, 1950
(Ex. PR S), and also admitted it had secured from
Felt and Associated Accountants an accounting
of all funds paid by Prudential to Accountants.
Reference to the Agreement of February 16,
1951 (Ex. PR 6) and to Findings 16 and 17 proves
that Cassady possessed complete knowledge of the
source of the funds which had been paid by Prudential to Associated Accountants, and finally received by it; approved the accounting of same and
exculpated Prudential from any charge of breach
of the contracts to which Prudential was a party
up to February 16, 1951. By this Agreement of February 16, 1951 it is manifest that the parties intended to rehabilitate Cassady and place it in a position to go forward with this construction work and
complete its contract with Felt. The agreement had
no other purpose. An extension of time was granted
13
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Cassady for performance; an adjustment was made
in the types of homes to be built by it, and payment
therefor, and Prudential was freed from limitations
on disbursement of the veteran-mortgagors' funds
by vesting in Prudential a discretion in making disbursement of the funds. (The veteran-mortgagors
gave their consent to this arrangement (R. 39, R.
105) These provisions were to aid Cassady in the
performance of its agreement. Cassady knew that
the funds it had been paid by Associated Accountants were proceeds of veterans' mortgages and by
agreeing that it had received from Felt and Associated Accountants an accounting of these funds,
it also agreed it has received all "available funds"
to date of the agreement. Cassady therefore foreclosed its right to question the amount of payments
it had received. It knew that the only funds to which
it was entitled were the "available" funds arising
from veterans' loans and when it agreed that Felt
and Associated Accountants had made accounting
to it for these funds "and confirmed and approved
all of the disbursements made by Associated Accountants to the date of the agreement", it in fact
agreed that it had received all payments due it to
February 16,1951. This amounted to broad approval
and exculpation by Cassady of all that occurred
before. By its own acts in prematurely entering upon
the construction work, it had made impossible com14
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pliance with the "course of construction" formula
by Felt, and by the Agreement of February 16,1951,
Cassady admitted that notwithstanding a variance
in the times of payment (caused by its own voluntary acts) it had received all that was due it from
Felt to February 16,1951.
3. Hartford is bound by the terms of the
Agreement of February 16, 1951. (Ex. PR 6)
An important provision (called hereinafter
"open door" provision) of the bond (Ex. PR 1) which
is the subject of this action reads as follows:
"6. The prior written approval of Surety shall be required with regard to any
changes or alterations in said contract where
the cost thereof, added to prior changes or
alterations, causes the aggregate cost of all
changes and alterations to exceed 10 per cent
of the original contract price; but, except as
to the foregoing, any alterations which may
be made in the terms of the contract, or in the
work to be done under it, or the giving by
the obligees of any extension of time for the
performance of the contract, or tmy other
forebearance on the part of either the obligees
or principal to the other, shall not in any way
release Surety or Principal of the obligations
of this instrument, notice of Surety of any
such alterations, extension, or forebearance
being hereby waived." (Italics supplied)
(Paragraph 6 of the Bond)
There is no question in this case that the cost
of any changes or alterations were less than 10%
15
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of the contract price. (Finding 30; R. 262) Cassady
only claimed that there was due it between fortyfour and fifty thousand dollars by way of dawmges
and "extras/' and the trial court denied that recovery. (R. 262) C. J. Cassady in his testimony
(R. 240-245) itemized the amount of Cassady's
claim for "extras" and damages and totaled the same
in the amount of $51,850.70 — an amount well
under 10% of the original contract price of $763,000.00 (Ex. PR 2). Therefore, the above quoted
provision of the bond became fully operative and by
it Cassady and Felt were at liberty to make any
changes or alterations in the contract which they
elected to make without consent of or notice to Hartford. The Court in its opinion in the case wrote:
"The trial court found that Hartford
did become a party to the supplemental contract by giving its approval to the modifications of the portion of the original contract
which it desired to have modified without
expressly limiting its agreement to the other
parts of the supplemental agreement."
The trial court found that the Supplemental
Agreement of February 16, 1951 (Ex PR 6) was
presented to Hartford and it gained full knowledge
thereof and that by endorsement it consented to
amendment of certain provisions of the contract of
July 19, 1950 and of August 22, 1950 (Finding
17). The trial court conduded as a matter of law
that:
16
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"8. Cassady irrevocably compromised
and settled all claims for breach of contract
or otherwise against Syndicate and Prudential or either of them arising prior to February 16, 1951 by the Supplemental Agreement
of February 16, 1951 and is estopped and
foreclosed from asserting same and Hartford
was informed and had complete knowledge
of Cassady's actions in this respect."
The Court in making the statement quoted
above from it opinion (Page 16 of this brief)
was entirely correct. Paragraph 6 of the bond
set forth in full above, authorized Cassady to
act for Hartford in Negotiating and executing the Supplemental Agreement of February
16, 1951 (Ex PR 6) inasmuch as there was
no increase in cost exceeding 10% of the "original
contract price." When the Supplemental Agreement
was presented to Hartford, it gave its affirmative
consent to certain provisions of the contract, but
it did not disavow the other provisions of the Supplemental Agreement. They became fully operative
against Hartford because the bond itself (Par. 6,
supra) specifically declared that "any alteration
which may be made in the terms of the contract, or
the work to be done under it * * * shall not in any
way release Surety or Principal of the obligations
of this instrument * * * * . "
It appears to be clear beyond argument that (a)
Cassady by the Supplemental Agreement of February 16, 1951 (Ex. PR 6) waived all claims for
17
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breach of contract by Felt prior to that date
(if any existed) and (b) by virtue of paragraph
6 of the bond Hartford is bound by such action on
the part of Cassady. Hartford, when the Supplemental Agreement was presented to it, had the opportunity of refusing to be a party to such arrangement; it did not The court, therefore, was wholly
justified in its statement above quoted.
4. Rartford must assume full responsibility
for Cassady's premature commencement of work on
the project and in assuming a "calculated risk" that
funds would be disbursed according to the "course
of construction" provisions of the contract
The witness, Scott, gave some illuminating evidence, which stands uncontradicted, concerning Cassady's premature commencement of work on the
Morningside Heights project:
"Q. Did you give the instructions to
commence work on construction early in June?
What were the circumstances of the construction? (R. 323)
A. Of the start of construction? (R.
324)
Q. Yes.
A. Well, it was a rather confused circumstances at the time. Mr. Cassady was having quite a bit of trouble making his bond,
and he had sent to Los Angeles for help on
that situation, and things in general looked
like they had reached a stand still, so Mr. Ross
18
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was in a hurry. He had gone to the expense
of buying steel forms for this project.
Q. Now, what was Ross' function?
A. He was the fellow that put in the
cement foundations, done the excavating and
back filling. He had purchased these three
sets of steel forms at about — cost of about
ten or twelve thousand dollars, and he was
in a hurry, so it was agreed to start ten or
twelve houses.
Q. When you say "it was agreed", who
agreed?
A. Everybody concerned; Mr. Ross,
Mr. Snyder, Mr. Cassady. The conference was
held in George Snyder's office.
Q. And that was when, late in May
1950?
A. Yes, that was in May.
Q. And that was done consciously with
a realization that financing had not been completed?
Mr. Christensen: I object to that as leading and suggestive, calling for a conclusion.
The Court: It seems to be leading.
Q. Well, you knew at that time that no
mortgages had been executed and delivered.
A. Yes.
Mr. Christensen: Same objection.
Q. You knew that.
The Court: The answer may stand (R.
324)
*

*

*

*

Q. What was said at that conference,
Mr. Scott? (R. 325)
19
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Mr. Christensen: Now wait a minute,
I would like to know who was present at that
conference.
A. All right, C. P. Cassady, C. J. Cassady, George Snyder, Mr. Ross and myself.
Mr. Christensen: Anyone representing
the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company so far as you know?
A. No. (R. 325)
Mr. Christensen: I will object to it as
hearsay.
The Court: The objection is overruled.
I will hear. While you may not be bound individually for anything, still you may be liable
under your contract if your insured is bound.
Mr. Riter: I think the question is good.
The Court: I will let him answer.
Q. All right, now, have you any recollection — and if you haven't any recollection,
simply say so — as to what you said to the
Cassadys or what Mr. George Snyder said
to the Cassadys (R. 325), or Mr. Ross said to
the Cassadys with respect to commencing work
on the project at the meeting? (R. 326)
A. Well, it would be rather hard for
me to recall exactly what was said there.
Q. Can you give the substance of it?
A. Well, the substance of the meeting
was that we went to work.
Q. Was anything discussed about the
fact that no mortgages were recorded?
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A. Yes, there was some discussion on
that, and that was prompted by a situation
that had arisen in the immediate past, and
that was the subject of Mr. Cassady's financial position. I'm not — at the time this bond
was applied for, a financial statement was
submitted, and the amount of cash shown on
that statement was very inadequate for the
undertaking of a project this size. Therefore,
Mr. Cassady obtained help on this situation.
Q. That help was from Mr. Peter Shelby?
A. Yes, and that financial situation
was discussed and the conclusion was that
between Mr. Shelby and Mr. Cassady they
had adequate financial strength to undertake
this project, (R. 326)
Q. And obtain a bond?
A. And go ahead with the construction
because the way the sales were — the sale
were very good. They were exceptionally fine.
And it was a conclusion of all present that
the sales program would not lag too far behind \amd it was a calculated thing that we
could.....
Q. You took a calculated risk on it?
A. Yes.
Q. And the two Cassadys participated
in that?
A. Definitely. (R 326)
*

*

*

*

Q. But will you give the substance of
that conference?
A. Well, it was as I have stated before,
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the conclusions were to go ahead. Mr. Ctiossady ST. and Jr. felt they were adequately
financed now to undertake the construction.
Q. But the bond had not been issued
yet?
A. I couldn't say for sure whether the
bond had been issued then — or I am quite —
it h a d . . . . (R.327)
*

*

*

*

Q. Well, I am going to help you out and
get the date of the bond and will ask you . . .
the bond bears date July 21, 1950. Was it
prior or after that date that this conference
was held?
A. It was prior to that date.
Q. The latter part of May?
A. Yes. (R. 327) (Italics supplied).
(Special Note: The rulings of the trial
court set forth above, on Appellant's objections were correct. By virtue of Paragraph 6
of the Bond, Hartford was represented at that
conference. Cassady represented Hartford).
Upon cross-examination of the witness, Scott,
he further elucidated this "calculated risk" thus:
"Q. And you used the expression "took
a calculated risk". As a matter of fact everybody at the meeting took a calculated risk,
didn't they?
A. Well in any building project, you
take a calculated risk going in at any time,
regardless of what the circumstances are.
Q. / mean by reason of the fact that
22
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they ivere going ahead prematurely, as you
put it. In other words there weren't any contracts signed yet. There wasn't a bond yet
but everybody was a little fidgety. They jumped in, and everybody knew they were taking
a chance? (R. 332)
A. In analyzing that situation as it
was, and coming out with a very considered
conclusion to start construction work, the conclusions supporting that act would have had
to have been substantial enough to convince
everybody there that the start should have
been made.
Q. Well, Mr. Scott, Tm not quarreling
with the wisdom of the decision. All I am saying that everybody knew they were taking a
chance.
A. I don't believe Felt figured they were
taking \® calculated risk in this respect * * *."
(R. 333)
*

*

*

*

Q. In any event, all of the factors that
went into the decision were brought up for
consideration and attention at that meeting,
and discussed?
A. All the problems that we could anticipate were discussed." (R. 333) (Italics supplied)
the
By
the
the

Hartford deliberately executed and delivered
bond (Ex PR 1) containing paragraph 6, supra.
including this provision in the bond, it opened
door to and assumed responsibility for exactly
kind of transaction as that which occurred be23
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tween Felt and Cassady with respect to commencement of work on the project. It authorized Cassady,
as its representative in connection with the bond,
to alter the terms of the construction contract in any
manner or degree so long as such alteration did not
increase the contract cost more than 10%. In this
connection the testimony of Mr. A. L. Blackburn,
Hartford's representative in negotiation of the bond
is interesting.
"Q. I take it that as a careful bonding
executive you had familiarized yourself with
the details of the project that was to be completed in Utah?
A.

Yes.

Q. You had become familiar generally
with the contracting parties and the basic
contract that you were to bond?
A. I was acquainted only with Cassady." (R. 414, 415)
The actual construction work on the project commenced prior to June 22, 1950 and at that
time Cassady knew that the channel through which
the required funds must flow had not been opened,
and would not be opened until sale of the houses
to veterans had been consummated, and veterans
mortgages negotiated, executed and recorded. (Findings 12 and 29) While the contract of July 19, 1950
(Ex PR 2) and the bond in question (Ex PR 1) had
not been executed, the terms of the contract had vir24
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tually been agreed upon (R. 329) at the time of
the May conference concerning which the witness
Scott, testified at length. The important aspect of
this situation is that it carried over into the contract of July 19, 1950 after it was actually signed,
and the bond issued by Hartford. Cassady, by its
own action had made impossible the regular performance by Felt of the provisions of the contract
calling for the "course of construction" payments.
"If the impossibility of performance
arises directly or even indirectly from the
acts of the promisee, it is a sufficient excuse
for non-performance. This is upon the principle that he who prevents a thing may not
avail himself of the non-performance which
he has occasioned. Non-performance of a
promise in accordance with its terms is excused if performance is prevented by the conduct of the adverse party." (12 Am. Jur. Contracts, Sec. 381, pg. 958; Bewick v. Mecham,
28 Cal. App. (2d) 92, 156 Pac (2d) 757;
Empson Packing Co. v. Claw son, 43 Colo. 188,
95 Pac 549; Chilton v. Oklahoma Tire and
Supply Co., 180 Okla. 39, 67 Pac. (2d) 27.)
Cassady is prevented from asserting that Felt
violated the "course of construction" provision of
the contract, because of its own deliberate action in
commencing work on the project with full knowledge of the result if funds were not available. Hartford through the "open door" provision of the bond
(Paragraph 6) is bound by Cassady's action and
25
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must bear the responsibility for the debacle which
followed.
POINT II
THE DETERMINATION THAT FELT DID NOT
COMMIT ANY SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATIONS OF ITS
CONTRACTS WITH CASSADY MADE IT UNNECESSARY FOR THE COURT TO CONSIDER THE EFFECT
OF THE "ESCAPE PARAGRAPH" OF THE BOND
QUOTED BY APPELLANT IN POINTS II AND III
OF ITS PETITION FOR REHEARING.

1. The fact that Felt did not violate its contracts with Cassady in any substantial manner deprives Hartford of any defense to PrudentiaVs claim
on the bond.
Respondent respectfully invites the court's attention to the following quotation from page 63 of
its original appeal brief:
"For the purpose of this discussion, let
it be assumed that Felt was guilty of substantial violations of the Felt-Cassady contract
of July 19, 1950 (Ex PR 2) in the particulars
alleged and claimed by Hartford."
Respondent in its brief then proceeded to discuss
the question as to whether Felt's breaches of contract were imputable to Prudential under the terms
of the bond. Respondent submitted its argument on
the hypothetical basis that if Felt substantially
breached the contracts with Cassady then such fact
did not bar PrudentiaVs recovery on the bond. The
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trial court by its Finding 39 determined that Felt
"did not breach its contractual obligations to Cassady in any substantial manner". This Finding shut
off Hartford's principal defense; hence there was no
fault of Felt to impute to Prudential. In Point I of
this answer and brief, respondent sincerely believes
that it has demonstrated that the trial court's Finding 39 is fully sustained by the evidence in this case
and determines all of the issues in respondent's favor. There is no necessity for the court considering
the "escape paragraph" of the bond, nor to enter
into a discussion as to its consequences.
2. Even if Felt were guilty of substantial violations of contracts with Cassady, such violations
cannot be imputed to Prudential so as to bar its
recovery on the bond.
Under Points VI, VIII, and IX of Respondent's
original appeal brief is fully discussed the interpretation of the "escape paragraph" and the construction and interpretation of the bond which Respondent now reasserts and affirms. It is submitted
that such discussion answers Appellant's contentions set forth in Point II and Point III of its Petition for Rehearing and it is unnecessary to repeat
same. Respondent submits that it had demonstrated
that even if such substantial violations on Felt's part
existed that they cannot be imputed to Prudential.
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CONCLUSION
1. Respondent invites the court's attention to
some extraordinary conditions in connection with
the form of the bond. (PR 1) In the first place, the
bond recognizes the existence of three obligees, Prudential, the LENDER OBLIGEE; Pacific, the
TITLE OBLIGEE; and Felt, the OWNER OBLIGEE. This fact alone must have informed Hartford
of unusual circumstances in connection with the
Morningside Heights project. Secondly, the naming
of another insurance company, Pacific, as TITLE
OBLIGEE, proclaimed that something had occurred
involving the priority of the liens of the Prudential
mortgages. It does not lie with Hartford, in view
of the form of the bond, to deny that it had knowledge when it executed and delivered the bond that
claims had already accrued through prematurity of
commencement of the work.
2. The court in its opinion correctly determined that Prudential is entitled to recover on the
bond the damages Which it has admittedly suffered.
The Petition for Rehearing should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANKLIN RITER
HARRY D. PUGSLEY
Attorneys for Prudential Federal
Savings and Loan Association
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